Enterprise AI Agent Governance: The Operating Model
An operating model for enterprise AI agent governance: who owns identity, roles, delegated admin, central policy and audit as agents spread across teams.
AI agent security, identity, governance, cost, and the engineering behind the control plane.
An operating model for enterprise AI agent governance: who owns identity, roles, delegated admin, central policy and audit as agents spread across teams.
Standing production access for agent operators is a permanent risk for an occasional need. How to build a break-glass path fast enough to use and safe to trust.
Denial of wallet attacks run up the bill until you take your service down yourself. How the attack works against agentic systems and which controls stop it.
A pragmatic guide to AI agent security for startups: the controls that matter most when you are moving fast and have limited security resources.
AI agents are deputies acting for principals. Confuse which principal an agent serves and its permissions become the attacker's. How to structure authority.
Crescendo and other multi-turn jailbreaks spread the payload so no single message looks malicious. Why stateless filtering misses them and what catches them.
How SaaS teams embedding AI agents keep multi-tenant data isolated, costs attributed per customer, and agent behavior governed at scale across tenants.
Excessive agency turns a model mistake into an incident. Its three components (excessive functionality, permissions, and autonomy) and the controls for each.
Red teaming AI agents is not prompt-hacking a chatbot: the objective is unauthorized action. A scope, a technique set, and a scoring model for useful findings.
What HIPAA and the EU AI Act ask of AI agents that touch PHI: minimum-necessary access, audit controls, risk classification and the evidence to keep.
A control plane in the request path is a dependency for every agent call. Which parts must fail closed, which can degrade, and how to plan each failure mode.
A RAG pipeline pulls attacker-influenced content into a model's context. How vector stores get poisoned, how retrieval leaks across tenants, and what holds.
Article 50 transparency obligations apply from 2 Aug 2026 — AI disclosure, synthetic-content marking, and what engineering teams must ship now.
What regulators expect of AI agents in banking and finance: EU AI Act high-risk uses such as credit scoring, GDPR duties, attributable actions and evidence.
Reconstructing what an AI agent did, why, and what it touched needs evidence most deployments never record. The minimum record set and how to investigate.
A claimed agent identity is worthless without verification. How decentralized identifiers and verifiable credentials establish it across trust boundaries.
Colorado SB 189 delayed the Colorado AI Act to January 1, 2027 and narrowed it to developer disclosure, consumer notice, and human-review duties.
The EU AI Act Digital Omnibus, in force since 27 July 2026, defers Annex III high-risk rules to Dec 2027 and Annex I to Aug 2028. Art. 50 applies from Aug 2026.
Why design-time controls are not enough for AI agents: the five runtime control classes that must sit outside the agent, and how they map to OWASP.
Spend caps and request throttling are different levers for controlling runaway AI agents. Learn when each applies, how they compose, and why you need both.
How opted-in target context selects synthetic probes that check organization-wide guardrails and intent rules, without calling production endpoints.
Goal hijacking redirects an AI agent's objective while it runs normally. How ASI01 attacks work and the controls that contain a hijacked goal.
Rotation that has never been exercised is not rotation. The overlap-window pattern, why agent fleets break it differently, and how to make it routine.
Why point-in-time authorization fails for long-running AI agents, and how continuous authorization contains privilege abuse — OWASP ASI03.